

CHAPTER XXVIII


THE AUTUMN

NEEDLESS to state, a great part of the events related in the last chapter was at the time unknown to the naval and military commanders-in-chief at the Dardanelles. As soon as Hamilton realised that he could not be reinforced after the fighting at Hill 60, his pre-occupation was—first, to readjust and organise his line; second, to rest those of his divisions which were worn out; and, third, to prepare for a further offensive—if not general, then local—so as to maintain the “offensive spirit” in the troops.

The orders for a readjustment of the garrison were issued as soon as the main offensive ended—that is to say, after the Battle of Scimitar Hill. The 13th Division,¹ which had so far fought under Birdwood, was to be returned to its proper corps at Suvla, the 54th (East Anglian Territorial) being transferred to Anzac in exchange. The move began on the night of August 28th, two battalions of the 13th marching from Anzac to Suvla, and two of the 54th the other way. The territorials were at once put into the line at Hill 60, a proportion of the mounted rifles and light horse remaining with them for a week until they were well settled in the position. At the same time General Godley, who had been controlling the “Force attacking Sari Bair”—that is to say, all the Anzac troops north of the old Anzac position—reverted to the command of the N.Z. & A. Division, which was given the sector next south of the 54th, facing Sari Bair. The old front of the N.Z. & A. at Walker’s Ridge, Russell’s Top, and the head of Monash Valley was to be taken up gradually by the 2nd Australian Division as it arrived from Egypt; indeed, as early as August 26th, the newly-arrived 20th Battalion had

¹ Then holding the sector facing Chunuk Bair and Hill Q. Gen. Maude had just taken command in place of Gen. Shaw, who had been invalided.

begun to take over from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade the trenches facing The Nek,³ and on the 28th the command on Russell's Top was assumed by General Holmes. The Anzac line, including its new extension to the north, would then be held, from north to south, by four divisions—the 54th, N.Z. & A., 2nd Australian, and 1st Australian. The sectors were—



NEW NUMBER OF SECTOR. ³	SECTOR.	COMMANDER.	TROOPS (LEFT TO RIGHT).
No. 4	Hill 60 (i.e., flank of Anzac, facing N.E. and E.).	Major - General F. S. Inglefield. ⁴	29th Indian Bde. (Susak Kuyu). 54th Division (Hill 60, and Damakjelik Bair to fork of Aghyl Dere).
No. 3	Sari Bair (i.e., facing E., opposite the main range from Chunuk Bair to Rhododendron, Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts).	Major - General Sir A. J. Godley.	N.Z. & A. Div. (as under): 4th Aust. Inf. Bde. (lower—i.e., north—Cheshire Ridge). N.Z.M.R. Bde. (upper — i.e., south—Cheshire Ridge). N.Z. Inf. Bde. (The Apex). 3rd A.L.H. Bde. (edge of Rhododendron above Sazli Dere, facing Battleship Hill). 1st A.L.H. Bde (No. 1 Outpost. Camel's Hump, Destroyer Hill, and picquet in Sazli Dere).

³ The light horse regiments had thus been made available for the fighting at Hill 60.

⁴ The sectors were at first numbered from 1 to 6, of which 1 to 4 were the original sections of the old Anzac position. See note on p. 44.

⁵ Maj.-Gen. F. S. Inglefield, C.B., D.S.O., p.s.c. Commanded 54th Div., 1914/16. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Devonport, Eng., 6 Dec., 1855. Died 22 July, 1930.

NEW NUMBER OF SECTOR.	SECTOR.	COMMANDER.	TROOPS (LEFT TO RIGHT).
No. 2	Old Anzac Left Section (ex- cluding Nos. 1 and 2 Out- posts). Old Anzac Left Central Sec- tion.	Major - General J. G. Legge.	2nd Aust. Div.
No. 1	Old Anzac Right Cen- tral Section. Old Anzac Right Sec- tion.	Major - General H. B. Walker.	1st Aust. Div. (in- cluding 2nd A.L.H. Bde.).

This arrangement was, however, largely modified by the employment of brigades of the strong and fresh 2nd Australian Division to relieve tired troops of the 1st Australian and N.Z. & A. Divisions, whose "sick-returns" were at this stage so high as to cause some perplexity. It happened that at the beginning of September one of the consulting physicians of the British Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Purves-Stewart,⁵ had been brought from England to advise concerning the sickness of Hamilton's army. He was at once impressed by a marked difference in the proportion of the sick in the three areas of the Peninsula, the numbers evacuated through illness during those weeks being:—

AREA.		PERCENTAGE EVACUATED SICK. Week ending Aug. 28.		Week ending Sept. 5.
Helles (about 26,000 troops)	..	4.4	..	5.1
Suvla (about 36,000 troops)	..	1.9	..	1.7
Anzac (about 30,000 troops)	..	6.6	..	7.5

He accordingly visited the three areas, but directed special attention to the Anzac troops, among whom sickness had reached the highest proportions. As a commission on epidemic diseases was already at work, he left to it the examination of those who were actually sick and the inquiry into sanitation, and confined himself to examining the troops who were supposed to be well—that is, who were on duty at the moment of examination. Between September 11th and 13th he medically sounded in the trenches 104 men from among the units which had been longest at Anzac, and checked his observations by testing 50 others from battalions of the 2nd Division which had landed not more than eight days

⁵ Col. Sir James Purves-Stewart, K.C.M.G., C.B.; R.A.M.C. Consulting Physician to H.M. Forces in Mediterranean, 1915/18; of London; b. Edinburgh, 20 Nov., 1869.

previously. The result of this test was set forth in his report to the Commander-in-Chief:—

The contrast between the old and the fresh troops was striking. The newly-arrived men were of splendid physique, in the pink of condition, active and alert. The older troops were emaciated in 77 per cent. of cases, and nearly all of them showed well-marked pallor of the face. There was no sponginess of the gums or other signs suggestive of scurvy. Sixty-four per cent. of these men were suffering from indolent ulcers of the skin, chiefly of the hands and shins. . . . A large proportion, 78 per cent., had occasional diarrhoeal attacks, but not enough to put them on the sick list. . . .

Most striking of all was the rapidity and feebleness of the heart's action, tachycardia being observed in 50 per cent. of the old troops. . . . The rapidity . . . could not be ascribed to sudden exertion, for each man was examined at his post, laying aside his rifle for a few minutes for purposes of medical investigation. Nor was it due to emotional disturbance, for notwithstanding the frequent impact of bullets and shells on the adjacent sandbags the pulse-rate did not momentarily become accelerated. Seventy-four per cent. of these troops suffered from shortness of breath, a condition which was conspicuously absent in the fresh troops.

The spirit and morale of these soldiers, whether of the old or newly-arrived troops, were excellent. Not one man hinted at the slightest inclination to be relieved from trench duty.

Herewith I subjoin a statistical table of my observations:—

—	Rapid, feeble heart, 90 and over.	Shortness of breath.	Emaciation.	Sores on skin.	Diarrhoea.
<i>Old troops.</i> —104 men from 7 battalions (average stay in Anzac—125 days)	52 (50 per cent.)	77 (74 p.c.)	80 (77 p.c.)	67 (64 p.c.)	81 (78 p.c.)
<i>Fresh troops.</i> —50 men from 2 battalions (average stay in Anzac—6 days)	Rapid, but not feeble 10 (20 per cent.)	none	none	4 (8 p.c.)	7 (14 p.c.)

The foregoing facts are significant, especially if it be borne in mind that they refer, *not to sick men*, but to men on active duty.

Purves-Stewart's conclusion was that the troops who had been in the Anzac trenches for a long period would be no longer equal to a forced march, or a long uphill charge, and that if pneumonia broke out during the approaching rainy season the mortality among them would probably be abnormally high. His opinion was that they could no longer be regarded as first-class troops. He therefore suggested that those who had been at Anzac continuously for four months or longer should be withdrawn from the Peninsula and given

abundant sleep and generous diet. "The ordinary rest-camp, with the usual games and other amusements, is unsuitable. Most of these men are too tired to play football, cricket, &c." He did not favour leave to Alexandria or Cairo, but suggested "a voyage to Australia and back, with a week or two on furlough in their own homes." For the fresher troops

who are at present physically fit, an important factor in maintaining their health would be the establishment of canteens, where the soldier might supplement his diet by minor luxuries of his own choosing.

It is rather as evidence of the condition of the old defenders of Anzac than for its actual influence on the course of events that this report is quoted. Before it was received most of the tired brigades were already resting. The 6th Brigade (of the 2nd Division), which was being introduced by instalments into the line at the time of Purves-Stewart's visit, had relieved the 1st and 2nd at Lone Pine and as far north as Courtney's, and the 7th had been sent temporarily into the N.Z. & A. Division's area, where it relieved three brigades—the New Zealand Infantry, 4th Australian, and New Zealand Mounted Rifles.⁶ The relieved brigades were brought to Mudros and stationed in camps on the western side of the harbour.⁷ After resting for a day or two they began light training for two hours each morning.⁸ In the afternoons cricket and football matches were played between the units and sometimes with the ships of the navy, while many of the officers and men walked to the neighbouring villages or across the hills to the natural hot springs at Thermæ. They bought fruit, and occasionally poultry, from the Greeks, and a certain amount of beer was to be had at the military canteens. A certain supply of "comforts" was available, presented by the people of Australia, and, for the sick, Red Cross stores in fair quantity.⁹ In some brigades the brass bands were

⁶ The 6th Bde (3,970) was far stronger than the combined 1st (1,290) and 2nd (1,812), and the 7th (3,908) than the N.Z. Inf. (959), 4th Aust. Inf. (906), and N.Z. M.R. (289). At Lemnos the M.R. Bde was transported from the steamer to the shore in a single barge.

⁷ The drafts of fresh reinforcements for the resting Aust. brigades were during this period sent direct to Anzac, where they were trained in the Reinforcement Camp, and joined their units on the return of the latter.

⁸ The N.Z. Mtd. Rifles, however, being joined at Mudros by over 1,000 reinforcements, formed practically a new brigade, and was trained for six hours daily. On returning to Anzac in November it was treated as a raw unit, its men being at first placed for experience among those of the N.Z. and 4th Aust. Inf. Bdes.

⁹ Steps were by this time being taken for the better regulation of these supplies and their disposal. On the s.s. *Borda*, however, a riot was caused among the troops by the discovery that goods labelled "a present from the people of Queensland" were being sold to them in the canteen. Such miscarriages seldom, if ever, occurred later in the war.

re-established, and the concert party of H.M.S. *Agamemnon* visited the troops—their first experience of a type of entertainment which in later years had a recognised place in the military system. Under these conditions the men's health rapidly improved. Nevertheless their normal strength did not return as quickly as had been hoped. At the end of September, after a four days' inspection, Lieutenant-Colonel Hearne,¹⁰ then acting as chief medical officer of the 1st Australian Division, reported:

The men on the whole show definite evidence of improvement in their general condition, but many are still very weak and listless, and many also have very bad teeth and would soon become casualties from sickness . . . as soon as placed upon a biscuit diet.

Making a careful classification of 3,263 men, he reported that 1,609 should be ready to return in four weeks, but 1,604 would not be fit in less than eight weeks, while 50 should never return to the front.¹¹ These facts were represented to the lines-of-communication authorities, with the result that it was not until the end of October and beginning of November that the troops who had left Anzac in September returned thither. Their arrival released for rest a further instalment of the old Anzac troops—the 3rd Infantry Brigade, portions of the light horse, the Indian mountain batteries, and others. But Ryrie's 2nd Light Horse Brigade, which had completed before any others the digging of its winter quarters, elected by a general vote to stay in its lines at Anzac rather than to take its rest and hand over its quarters to other troops.¹²

During the months when the greater part of the N.Z. & A. and 1st Australian Divisions were at Lemnos, the main defence of Anzac, from Lone Pine to The Apex and Cheshire Ridge, rested upon the very strong units of the 2nd Australian Division, only the extreme north being held by the 54th (East Anglian Territorial), and the extreme south by the 1st

¹⁰ Col. W. W. Hearne, DSO A D M S., 5th Aust. Div., 1916/17. Medical practitioner; of South Melbourne; b. Bega, N.S.W., 7 Feb., 1871. Killed in action, 17 Oct., 1917.

¹¹ Of those classed unfit for eight weeks no less than 607 required "extensive dental attention, 409 being "bad" dental cases

¹² "A change," wrote Lieut.-Col. Wilson of the 5th, "meant that on our return we should probably have to dig a fresh set of dugouts and collect a fresh lot of camp equipment. The opinion was almost unanimous that it was not worth subsequent inconvenience. Later on in the year this opinion changed, but we did not get the offer repeated." The main cause of the change of opinion was a growing bombardment by the enemy's "broom-stick" bombs, of which on one day no less than 200 are said to have fallen in the brigade's area

Australian Divisions respectively.¹³ The commander and staff of the N.Z. & A. still controlled The Apex and Cheshire Ridge sector, but their front-line troops were entirely those of the newly-arrived 7th Brigade. Behind it what was practically an inner line was held by the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades,¹⁴ which, like the 2nd, had in August been strengthened by the 11th and 12th Regiments of the dismembered 4th Light Horse Brigade.¹⁵ The inner line of the old Anzac position was held by the 13th Light Horse Regiment, originally of the 4th Brigade, but now allotted as divisional cavalry to the 2nd Australian Division.

The 2nd Division came to Anzac under a commander and staff who thoroughly knew that position. General Legge, when relinquishing on July 26th the command of the 1st Division in order to organise into a division in Egypt the 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Brigades, had taken with him among others the following officers:—

Major Blamey (from 1st Div. Gen. Staff), to be A.A. & Q.M.G.¹⁶

Major Gellibrand (from 1st Div. Admin. Staff), to be D.A.A. & Q.M.G.

Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott, R.E. (from staff of 1st Div. Engineers), to command engineers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton¹⁷ (from 3rd Field Ambulance), to be A.D.M.S.

The Defence Department in Melbourne telegraphed that it could not supply officers to staff the division, but suggested that they should be obtained from units then in Egypt or

¹³ The 1st Aust. Div. during these months comprised only the 3rd Inf and 2nd L.H. Bdes.

¹⁴ These brigades occupied No. 1 and Old No. 3 Outposts, Camel's Hump, Destroyer Hill, Rhododendron (but not The Apex), and Table Top. Part of this line was, strictly speaking, not an inner position, but it was unlikely to be attacked until The Apex had been taken by the enemy. The 1st and 3rd Bdes. held these positions from the end of the August offensive until the Evacuation; but from Oct onwards they were allowed to send away batches of men to rest at Lemnos.

¹⁵ The 4th L.H. Bde. had been broken up in Egypt and was not re-constituted until Feb., 1917, when the 4th, 11th, and 12th Regts. were combined under a new staff. It then formed part of the Imperial Mtd. Div.

¹⁶ Legge had asked for Col. T. H. Dodds, then Adjutant-General in Melbourne, as his A.A. & Q.M.G., but the Defence Department, being very short of experienced staff officers, could not then spare him. The position was then allotted temporarily to Maj. Blamey, who had originally been appointed as second General Staff officer upon Legge's staff.

¹⁷ Col. A. Sutton, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.M.S. and Aust. Div., 1915/17. Medical practitioner, of Brisbane, b. Egham, Surrey, Eng., 25 March, 1863. Died 15 Apr., 1922.

Gallipoli. It was, however, not yet easy to obtain in the A.I.F. officers with the requisite experience of "general staff" work.¹⁸ For the "operations" and "intelligence" branches, therefore, General Legge secured in Egypt three British officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Gwynn¹⁹ (formerly Director of Military Art at the Military College, Duntroon) becoming chief of his staff.

The elements from which Legge had to construct his division were the three infantry brigades then training under General Spens, the corresponding field ambulances and companies of transport, and three sections of signallers; but there were lacking three field companies of engineers, all the artillery of a division, part of the signallers and transport, and the divisional cavalry. When the decision to create the division was first made at Anzac, Legge had submitted a scheme for making good the deficiency. The breaking up of the 4th Light Horse Brigade enabled its 13th Regiment to be assigned to the 2nd Division as cavalry, and its signal troop and transport were also taken over. Legge brought from Anzac a headquarters staff for his divisional engineers, as well as the staff of two field companies. The rank and file of the engineers were easily provided by the 5th and 6th Infantry Brigades, in which qualified tradesmen were found in plenty, each battalion of the 5th Brigade furnishing forty-one men—that is, a section—for the 4th Field Company, and the 5th Field Company being similarly formed from the 6th Brigade. In the meantime it happened that the Defence Department in Melbourne had, independently of Legge's efforts, cabled to the British Government an offer to raise in Australia most of the troops necessary to complete the division, including three field artillery brigades (without, however, the normal brigade of howitzers). The offer had been accepted, with the result that some of the units improvised by Legge were being duplicated in Australia. The Defence Department was raising, for example, three field companies and a headquarters of engineers, and the necessary transport

¹⁸ Maj. Blamey, however, an Australian officer of high attainments, was at first appointed G.S.O.(2), but did not act in that capacity, being transferred to the control of the "A" and "Q" branches.

¹⁹ Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles Gwynn, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c. B.G.G.S., XXII (II Anzac) Army Corps, 1916/19. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Ramelton, Co. Donegal, Ireland, 4 Feb., 1870.

and signal units.²⁰ But, as it was unlikely that the troops from Australia could arrive in time to accompany the 2nd Division to the front, Legge continued to raise and train his own units—with the exception of the artillery, which he had no means of forming.²¹ From August 2nd to 7th the men for his two “improvised” engineer companies were being collected; and when on August 9th they began training, the 2nd Division—except that it had no artillery—was practically complete. Its training, however, was far from finished. The infantry brigades had arrived in Egypt at midsummer, when outdoor training between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. was almost impossible. Most of the battalions had completed only their elementary field-training, and the brigade staffs were inexperienced. The officers of the 6th Brigade, which had been longest in Egypt,²² had received some instruction in staff work. Legge, who was an administrator of first-rate capacity, at once undertook the training of his division; but within a fortnight, on August 11th, the Egyptian War Office received from Hamilton an urgent request for the “brigade . . . most advanced in training.” Legge sent the 5th, whose commander and staff, as well as a large proportion of the men, had already served in New Guinea. On August 22nd Hamilton telegraphed for another brigade, and the 6th was despatched. Two days later came a further message asking for the 7th Brigade and, if they were sufficiently trained, the 13th Light Horse and the two engineer companies. It was added that Legge and the staff of the division should now be sent. As a matter of fact, one section of the 4th Field Company had already gone, and had been in action, together with the 18th Battalion, at

²⁰ There were thus formed the 4th and 5th Fld. Coys. in Egypt and 4th, 5th, and 6th Fld. Coys. in Australia. The original 5th Coy. (that formed in Egypt) was six months later designated the 8th, and that raised in Australia as the 4th became the 7th.

²¹ It had originally been proposed that one brigade of the 1st Div. Artillery should be allotted to the 2nd Div. This transfer, however, was not effected—probably because, after the failure of the Aug. offensive, the 2nd Div. was not in the near future to move and act as a self-contained force. To render it eventually self-supporting the War Office was asked to supply its proper lines-of-communication units—a field bakery, field butchery, sanitary section, infantry base-depôt headquarters, and five depôt-units of supply.

²² The battalions of the 6th Bde, disembarked on June 10 and 12, the 17th Bn. on June 12, and the remainder of the 5th Bde, between July 23 and 26. Of the 7th Bde., two battalions, the 27th and 28th, disembarked on July 6 and 2 respectively, and part of the 26th Bn. on June 30, the rest of the 26th and the 25th did not reach Cairo until Aug. 5.

Hill 60. The remainder of the 4th and 5th Field Companies left Cairo on September 3rd.²³

The voyage of the divisional headquarters and of the 6th Brigade was now interrupted by the first torpedoing that occurred to any transport carrying Australian troops. On the morning of September 2nd the *Southland*, carrying General Legge with his staff, the 21st Battalion, a company of the 23rd, and a few "details" of British artillery and yeomanry, was on her course under a clear sky with a fresh breeze about forty miles south of Lemnos, no other ship being in sight and the only land visible being the Greek island of Strati. At 9.43 those on deck saw in the water on the port side the wake of a torpedo that was travelling apparently straight for the bow of the ship. As they watched helplessly, it reached the side and there followed an explosion which blew a hole, forty feet by twelve, on the water-line below the bridge. A number of deck stanchions were driven through the opposite side of the ship, creating a hole there also. Several men were killed, and an officer of the 21st (Captain Langley²⁴) who was sitting on the forward hatch was thrown into the air and fell through the hatch into the bilge. The sound of water rushing into the ship could be heard, and she heeled somewhat to port, her bow also dipping.²⁵ A second torpedo passed harmlessly astern. At the same instant whistles were blown, and the crowded troops, who on the previous day had learnt their boat-stations, began to run to them without disorder, and stood quietly awaiting directions. The ship's captain, Kelk, with chief officer Jones and second officer Robertson, superintended the lowering of the boats; but, as that operation commenced, some of the stewards and stokers, breaking from control, took up a position near the water-line and began to rush at each boat as it was lowered. Shortly afterwards, as a boat containing a number of troops and the headquarters of the 6th Brigade reached the water, they clambered into and

²³ Their respective commanders—Maj. S. F. Newcombe, R.E.; and Maj. V. A. H. Sturdee of the 2nd Fld. Coy., from Anzac—joined them at this time. Newcombe had been serving on the intelligence staff of the Egyptian War Office, being distinguished for his work and travels among the Arabs.

²⁴ Lieut.-Col. G. F. Langley, D.S.O. Commanded 1st Anzac Camel Bn., 1916/18; 14th L.H. Regt., 1918. High-school teacher; of Mansfield, Vic.; b. Port Melbourne, Vic., 1 May, 1891.

²⁵ See plate at p 742; also Vol XII, plate 134.

capsized it; another was upset by bumping into the overturned boat; and a third, containing clerks and other personnel of divisional headquarters, was upset by the releasing of a rope while it was still in the air. Since only a portion of the crew now remained aboard, the ship's officers were forced to carry on their work mainly by means of the troops; these under their own officers were maintaining perfect discipline, either standing quietly at their stations or, as ordered, steadily lowering and manning the boats.²⁶ Unfortunately, in order to free certain boats after launching, some of the "falls" attaching them to the davits had been cut,²⁷ with the result that the ship's officers had to improvise means of lowering the remainder. Volunteers dived into the water to right one of the boats and secure the severed "falls," and by following every instruction the greater part of the troops had been transferred to boats and rafts, which were standing off from the ship, when about 11 o'clock a yellow funnel appeared on the horizon, and half-an-hour later the hospital ship *Neuralia* rushed up, pushing masses of white foam before her bows. Her decks were crowded with crew and nurses, all in life-belts in case a torpedo might be launched at her. The 400 men who, with General Legge and his staff, were still in the *Southland* were transferred to the *Neuralia*, which also picked up some of those in the boats. Other ships, arriving later, rescued the remainder. In the *Southland*, which was then dependent upon the holding of one bulkhead, Captain Kelk had asked for volunteers to stoke the ship, if possible, into port. Accordingly Lieutenant Pearce²⁸ of the 21st Battalion, with five other officers and twelve men from that and other units, stayed in the ship and, though


²⁶ The spirit of the men on the crowded decks at this time may be illustrated by a remark made to Maj. F. W. D. Forbes (of Melbourne) of the 21st by one of the men, formerly a bullock-driver from the Otway Ranges, who was in the ranks near him. "I can't swim, sir," he said, "but this is the best chance ever I had of learning." The ship at one time gave a sudden lurch to starboard, but no men left their places or attempted to jump overboard, and, though rafts were moored alongside with no one watching them, they were unoccupied until the order was given to man them. Among the officers then on deck was Capt. Langley, who, as has been related, had at first been thrown into the bilge but had been rescued. He continued to direct his men, both on deck and in their life-boat, until they were picked up, when he collapsed. Others who had been severely injured by the explosion were sent away among the first, Capt. J. P. Fogarty (of Kew, Vic.), medical officer of the 21st, arranging this and also clearing the sick bay.

²⁷ There is some evidence that the crew was not in every case responsible for this.

²⁸ Capt. J. W. Pearce, M.C.; 21st Bn. Mine manager; of Ballarat, Vic.; b. Ballarat, 9 Feb., 1886. Killed in action, 4 Oct., 1917.

she was fourteen feet down by the bows, brought her successfully into port²⁹ Thirty-two Australians lost their lives, most being drowned. Among them was Colonel Richard Linton, commander of the 6th Brigade, whose boat had been overturned.³⁰

The headquarters of the 2nd Division arrived at Anzac on September 6th, and by the 8th was established on terraces in Rest Gully.³¹ On that day General Legge became responsible for the proper front of his division—from Wire Gully to Walker's Ridge—as well as for Lone Pine and the front facing the Jolly, which were taken over in order to afford rest to part of the 1st Division. For a similar reason the 7th Brigade a few days later took over the line at The Apex and Cheshire Ridge under the control of General Godley and the staff of the N.Z. & A. Division. The infantry of the 2nd Division was then disposed from left to right as follows:—



Under N.Z. & A. Division—

- 7th Bde.: 25th Bn.—Lower (Northern) Cheshire Ridge.
- 27th Bn.—Upper (Southern) Cheshire Ridge.
- 28th Bn.—The Apex.
- 26th Bn.—In reserve.

Under 2nd Aust. Division—

- 5th Bde.: 20th Bn.—Russell's Top.
- 19th Bn.—Pope's.
- 17th Bn.—Quinn's.
- 18th Bn.—(Only 350 strong after Hill 60)—in reserve.

²⁹ When the call for volunteers was made, someone asked the chief engineer of the *Southland*: "Is it good enough?" "I don't give it much chance," was the reply, "but I've a wife and kids and it's good enough for me." The troops immediately volunteered for duty. During part of the journey Pearce was given charge of the engines.

³⁰ Col. Linton was in the water for an hour and a half before he was picked up, exhausted, by one of the boats. He opened his eyes and said: "Good boys! Good luck, boys!" but died two hours later on board the French destroyer *Massuo*.

³¹ See *Vol. XII*, plate 135.

Under 2nd Aust. Division—

6th Bde.: 21st Bn.—Courtney's and line facing German Officers'.

22nd Bn.—Line facing Jolly.

23rd Bn. & 100 men 13th L.H.	} relieving each other every 48 hours—Lone Pine.
24th Bn. & 100 men 13th L.H.	

With the exception of the 18th the battalions were all practically at full strength, and, though for the most part not fully trained, were entirely adequate for the tasks of Anzac. The only serious weakness lay in the senior officers, a proportion of whom were unfitted by age, physique, or temperament for service at Anzac. General Holmes, however, who now held the combined command of Russell's Top and Monash Valley, afforded a striking example to the contrary. An experienced administrator, in civil life the Secretary of the Sydney Water Board, and a militia officer of long and keen service, he possessed also fine moral qualities, transparent sincerity, energy, and courage. From the first he regularly visited every point of danger in his lines—the crater at The Nek from which his bomb-throwers kept up a duel with the Turks, the empty gully beyond the last wire entanglement in Monash Valley³² where the patrols of the two sides were now occasionally meeting. The other brigadiers—Colonel Burston of the 7th Brigade (an ex-Lord Mayor of Melbourne) and Colonel Spencer Browne,³³ of the 6th (formerly a leader-writer on a Brisbane newspaper and an officer of distinguished service in the South African War)—were unable, in spite of their plucky efforts, to endure the physical conditions of Anzac, and were quickly superseded by younger men, Lieutenant-Colonels Gwynn (Legge's first chief-of-staff) and Paton. Several of the senior regimental officers were gradually replaced by more suitable men, while Holmes as far as possible began to staff his battalions with young officers of high fighting qualities.

³² This position was called "Hinton's Post" after Lieut. Hinton of the 2nd L.H. Regt., who held it during the Turkish attack on June 30.

³³ Maj.-Gen. R. Spencer Browne, C.B., V.D. Commanded No. 2 Command Dépôt, A.I.F., 1916/17. Journalist; of Brisbane, Q'land, and Appin, N.S.W.; b Oaklands, N.S.W., 13 July, 1956. (Col. Spencer Browne came to Egypt in command of the 4th L.H. Bde., but after its dissolution was brought to Anzac to fill the vacancy caused by Col. Linton's death.)

For the reasons given in the preceding chapter, during the last four months of the campaign there occurred no heavy fighting in Gallipoli. Although a combined thrust from Suvla towards Kavak Tepe, and from Anzac to Chunuk Bair, was continuously prepared for, the actual efforts were practically restricted to those of trench-warfare. The artillery at Anzac was increased to 109 guns, including the 17th Siege Battery of four modern 6-inch howitzers, two of which, emplaced far north in Taylor's Hollow, henceforth formed part of the main defence of Lone Pine. During the same months the sniping was rendered even keener than before by the provision of telescope-rifles, magnifying sights, silencers for fitting to rifle-muzzles, and a locally-invented device (known as the "Wallaby sniping cage") for clamping down rifles to fire on fixed targets. The operations of the Anzac troops in the open were, however, confined to mere movements of scouts and patrols.³⁴ From Rhododendron and Cheshire Ridges and other positions on the northern front this patrolling was carried on with great daring, especially in the Sazli ravine. The light horse scouts, creeping by night through the scrub amid many relics of the lost Gurkhas and Wiltshire,³⁵ frequently encountered the patrols of the enemy. Although the aim was to get out earlier than the enemy scouts, lie quiet, and secure information, fighting was sometimes unavoidable. Thus Sergeant Wilson,³⁶ leading a patrol of the 9th Light Horse, came suddenly upon a party of Turkish scouts, who fired, wounding him. He shot one, bayoneted a second, and with a bomb wounded a third who was fleeing, and was then helped back to Rhododendron Ridge by his men. In the more dangerous sector of Russell's Top Lieutenant Bailey³⁷

³⁴ At Helles a successful minor advance was made (on Nov. 15) under cover of naval fire. At Suvla the yeomanry carried out a highly successful raid. At Anzac the line was extended for 120 yds. south of Chatham's Post, and some ground was stolen at Lone Pine; but these advances involved no open assault.

³⁵ See note on p 714.

³⁶ Lieut. G. R. Wilson; 11th L.H. Regt. Drover, of Adelaide; b. Torrensvile, S. Aust., 2 July, 1882 [Other fine scouts of the same brigade were Cpl. C. B. Rickard (of Northam, W. Aust.), 10th L.H. Regt.; and Sgt. F. J. Linacre (of Gisborne, Vic.) and Cpl. J. Fryday (of Taranaki, N.Z.) of the 9th Regt.]

³⁷ Lieut. J. C. Bailey; 20th Bn. Builder; of Brisbane, b. Drayton, Q'land, 31 Oct., 1881.

and the scouts of the 20th Battalion explored No-Man's Land at The Nek. On at least two occasions this was effected in broad daylight by means of the covering fire of the garrison, which carefully shot down all Turkish periscopes in the sector while Sergeant Vince³⁸ and Corporal Brennan³⁹ crept forward to the enemy's parapet and examined such trenches as were within view. In the narrow No-Man's Land at The Apex scouts of the 7th Brigade frequently crawled by night to within a few yards of the enemy's line.⁴⁰ In bush scouting at least the Turk was equally daring. Thus in the Sazli Dere an Australian scout, a good bushman, who was lying out only twenty yards in advance of the trenches and with a mate not far away, was found stabbed through the heart, with his skull broken in.


During these months, however, the serious offensive action of Birdwood's force was not on the surface, but underground. The resumption of an active offensive, which, as has been mentioned, was always in prospect, could not be undertaken at Anzac by the ordinary means. At all vital points the enemy's defences were too strong by both nature and fortification, and they were constantly being strengthened. Birdwood therefore decided that the best chance of successful assault lay in undermining them. Accordingly there was commenced in September a comprehensive scheme for tunnelling beneath the enemy at The Apex, The Nek, Pope's, Quinn's, Courtney's, German Officers', Jolly, Lone Pine, and Ryrie's Post. The most ambitious proposals were those of General Legge. He proposed not only to undermine the hostile works at Lone Pine by sinking a shaft sixty feet in depth and thence driving galleries to points beneath the enemy's rear trenches; but also to effect the passage of The Nek by means of two spacious

³⁸ C.S.M. C. H. Vince, M.M. (No. 1033, 20th Bn.). Builder and contractor; of Sydney, b. Stepney, London, 1881.

³⁹ Sgt. H. Brennan, D.C.M. (No. 503, 20th Bn.). Engineer, of Sydney, b. Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, 1888. Killed in action, 6 Apr., 1918.

⁴⁰ The N.Z. infantry and the 28th Bn. began the scouting at The Apex. Later Lieut. J. E. Nix (of Charters Towns, Q'land), Sgts. H. Morrison (of Dalby, Q'land), A. V. Bracher (of Brisbane), and others of the 25th Bn. made bold reconnaissances there, and Lieut. H. H. Page (of Sydney) and Sgt. Bracher at Russell's Top.


galleries, dug at a very deep level, and so directed as ultimately to emerge in rear of that key-position. Both passages were to be wide enough to admit of troops marching through them two abreast. This proposal, though opposed by the chief engineer of the division, was considered of sufficient importance to be referred to G.H.Q., and was approved of by Birdwood on September 21st. The undertaking was to be kept as far as possible secret, and formed no part of the regular mining scheme on Russell's Top, but was carried out by Captain Arnall⁴¹ of the 19th Battalion with a special party of miners from the infantry. In order to safeguard the secret it was never specifically mentioned in the daily reports or correspondence. But many of the troops of the 2nd Division were nevertheless aware of the plan, and some critics, putting it down as a wild venture, gave the tunnel the nickname of "Arnall's Folly" by which it was generally known. Nevertheless by the beginning of December it was approaching the line of the Turkish trenches at The Nek, when picking was heard which made it appear likely that the enemy had anticipated the work or else was digging a similar tunnel. The sound, however, proved to be that of the picks in one of the low-level galleries of the regular Australian mining system far above. The workers in the higher gallery had heard those in Arnall's, and, being ignorant of its position, had judged that the sounds came from an enemy mine and were digging to meet it.



The underground fighting at Anzac during this stage was keen and close. It may be briefly illustrated by describing the course of events at Lone Pine and Russell's Top respectively. At Lone Pine, when the 1st Australian Division on

⁴¹ Maj. H. F. Arnall; 2nd Pioneer Bn. Area officer; of East Maitland, N.S.W.; b. Truro, England, 10 May, 1871.

September 12th handed over the position to the 2nd Division,⁴² the Turks had established a new line, in most parts twenty to thirty yards distant from the Australian posts, but at some points separated from them only by a barricade. A Turkish attack was not much feared, except at the weakest points, which were: in the south—the south-eastern angle of the position (Tubb's Corner) where the Turkish lines at the head of The Cup ran close; in the north—the posts at the head of the three old projecting saps originally held by Lloyd, Mackay, and McDonald.



⁴² The narrative of events at Lone Pine after the great attack of Aug. 6 to 10 ended, and while the position was still held by the 1st Div., is as follows:—

By Aug. 12, the trenches having been cleared of between 400 and 500 dead, it was possible to improve the defences by constructing snipers' posts and deepening the saps. A beginning was made with a new front line (Troop Lane) joining Sasse's with the three old communication trenches in which had been Lloyd's, Mackay's, and McDonald's Posts. The throwing of bombs at almost all the posts was continuous during the dark hours; but the advanced positions were lightly held, with the reserves close at hand under bomb-proof cover, and casualties were therefore few. The trenches were constantly bombarded by a 75-mm. and other field-guns.

Aug. 14.—At 6.30 p.m. the Turkish artillery sharply bombarded Lone Pine. Immediately afterwards the enemy was seen by the observers of the 1st N.Z. Bty. on Russell's Top to be crowding his front trenches. The battery, as had often occurred during the Lone Pine fighting, was at once turned upon this target. All was then quiet until shortly after midnight, when a bomb-attack was made by the Turks against both the 5th Bn. in the southern section of Lone Pine and the 1st in the central section. In the southern the Turks attempted to seize the position but were beaten back. In the central the post of the 1st Bn. in Lloyd's Trench (Sap A) and the trenches around it were heavily bombed. Through the smoke of the Australian bombs thrown in reply could be seen the enemy's bayonets as the Turks leapt over the open from one old trench to another. The N.C.O. in charge at Lloyd's—one of the finest in the 1st Bn., Sgt. Kavanagh—and a dozen men were killed or wounded. Word had been sent to ease out along the trench, which was thus too thinly guarded, and the Turks seized Lloyd's Trench. A cry for officers being raised, Capt. Jacobs, after arranging for a supply of grenades, bombed along the trench with Lieut. F. L. Flannery (of Sydney) and drove the enemy out. The Australian casualties numbered 31. Sgt. Freame was among the wounded.

Aug. 20.—The enemy concentrated his efforts on digging and covering his new front line.

Aug. 22.—The Turks, after bombardment, attempted to render Sap B (Mackay's Trench) untenable by destroying the barricade. This sap, which protruded farthest and was consequently most subject to attack, was held by the light horse squadron supplementing the infantry garrison in the Pine. On previous days the 7th L.H. had bombed the enemy to a distance from the barricade by blowing in part of his head-cover and raining bombs into the open. On Aug. 22, however, when a squadron of the 4th Regt. was holding the post, the enemy, apparently firing along the sap with a machine-gun, cut down with bullets part of the barricade before the garrison realised what was his purpose. A second barricade was then constructed five feet in rear of the first, and the space between the two was filled in with earth. As the Turks were heard mining, a tunnel was begun from Sap C (McDonald's) to protect Sap B.

These were now known as Saps "A," "B," and "C" respectively. The old Traversed Trench, which formerly led from Mackay's (Sap B) to Lloyd's (Sap A), had been roofed by the Turks with heavy timber about August 20th; and before the 1st Division handed over to the 2nd, the enemy, by tunnelling from various old trenches close to the Australian front line, had begun to threaten its weak points both at Tubb's Corner and at Sap B. To meet this danger defensive tunnels were commenced. The course of the fighting which ensued was as follows:—

Sept. 11.—A Turkish mine-tunnel from the direction of Jacobs's Trench was approaching the southern flank of Lone Pine so closely that a counter-mine was fired by the 2nd Field Company, blowing an opening into the enemy's gallery. When the tamping was removed, shots were exchanged. Each side barricaded its tunnel and posted sentries.

Sept. 12.—Units of the 1st Aust. Div. were withdrawn from Lone Pine, the defence of which was henceforth entrusted to the 2nd Div., the 23rd Bn. alternating every 48 hours with the 24th, each supplemented by about 100 of the 13th L.H. Regt. Half of the 4th Field Company under Capt. Barber⁴³ replaced the 2nd Field Company.

Sept. 21.—One of the Australian tunnels for the protection of Sap B broke into a Turkish gallery. Another enemy tunnel was broken into near Jacobs's. In the struggle at Sap B, the Turks seized the hole connecting the galleries, but two days later their sentry was killed or driven away by a number of bombs which were thrust down the gallery on a small trolley and then electrically exploded. The tunnel was thus recovered. In consequence of the position of the Turks in numerous old works round the Pine, the attempt of the Australian miners to establish a protective "envelope" of galleries failed.

Oct. 4.—The enemy sharply bombarded the Lone Pine position for an hour, from 9 to 10 a.m. As there were indications of a pending attack, the 17th British Siege Battery at Taylor's Hollow was asked to turn its fire upon the front of the Pine. Several shells were placed upon the enemy's position. A few Turks afterwards came up Sap C (McDonald's) and tried to dislodge the parapet. Two were shot, and the attempt withered.


Oct. 17.—Enemy mines were almost beneath the south-eastern angle (Tubb's Corner) and Sap B. Near the former the Turks exploded a mine between a high-level Australian gallery and a low-level one. The upper gallery was destroyed and a sapper killed. The low-level mine was fired next day, destroying the Turkish gallery. At Sap B on Oct. 18 an enemy tunnel reached a point almost beneath the barricade. A small countermine was unsuccessfully fired. Larger charges were therefore placed in two neighbouring mines, the garrison was withdrawn from the barricade, the head of the sap was blown in, and the enemy works were destroyed.

⁴³ Col C. S. Barber, M.C., V.D.; 4th Fld Coy. Engrs. Mining engineer, of Melbourne; b Melbourne, 6 July, 1888.

Oct. 19.—It was decided to establish a new firing line across the interval between Sap A (Lloyd's) and Sap B. To make sure that the area was not undermined, two galleries were tunnelled eastwards. On Oct. 26 that nearest to Lloyd's drove into a Turkish tunnel. The hole was for the moment closed up again; but, seeing that this Turkish gallery must be captured if the new line was to be dug, Capt. Barber the same night ordered it to be reopened and enlarged for reconnaissance. While attempting to carry this out the sappers were fired on. A small charge was therefore placed above the hole and exploded without tamping, enlarging the opening into the Turkish mine. The entrance was then again blocked for several days in order to allow a new tunnel to be dug beneath the enemy's work so as to break up into it. On the night of Nov. 6 the lower tunnel was ready, and, as Lieut. Carr⁴⁴ of the 24th Bn. at a pre-arranged moment looked through the hole in the roof of the Turkish tunnel, he saw Capt. Barber with an electric torch emerging through the hole in its floor. An exploration of the enemy's galleries at once began, and showed that a system of tunnels existed, all eventually leading to a large trench, eight feet wide and covered with heavy "six by eight" timber. The existence of this covered gallery had been known, since its timbers could be seen on the surface. It led from Owen's Gully, and at one time the enemy used to penetrate through it into the space between Saps A and B, and bomb from there. The story of the August fighting at Lone Pine was unknown to anyone then in the garrison, but this trench was none other than the old Traversed Trench which had been held on Aug. 6 and 7 by Mackay, Scott, Howell-Price, Osborne, and their men.

The section of the old trench which the exploring party now entered was about 25 yards long, the ends being blocked by the breaking-down of the roof through howitzer shells. A sentry was placed at the north-eastern end, and a barricade was pluckily built there by Corporal Graham⁴⁵ of the engineers, using the old timbers. The Turks who were beyond the next bend contented themselves with building a barricade near Graham's. An attempt on Nov. 7 to drive the Australians from the position by bombing failed.

The old trench had been used as a base for Turkish mining against Sap B, and Graham with Lieut. McGregor⁴⁶ of the 23rd, on exploring the tunnels, found several which led round to rejoin it at points beyond the Turkish barrier. Crawling down one towards its opening McGregor saw, close in front of him, the legs of some of the enemy's garrison. In the daylight at the end of another was a Turkish sentry with his rifle across his knees. Steps were accordingly taken



⁴⁴ Capt. G. M. Carr, M.B.E.; 24th Bn. D.A.A.G., A.I.F. Dépôts in the United Kingdom, 1918/19. Architect; of Sydney; b. Fitzroy, Vic., 10 Jan., 1888.

⁴⁵ Sgt. D. Graham, D.C.M. (No. 4082, 4th Fld. Coy. Engrs.). Sheet metal worker, of Sydney; b. Whitburn, Linlithgow, Scotland, 1877.

⁴⁶ Capt. H. A. McGregor, M.C., 23rd Bn. Tea planter; b. Cork, Ireland, 25 Oct., 1888.

50 25 0 50 100 150 FT



British works, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 2 metres.

to barricade this communication and undermine the Turkish post, which on Nov. 14 was blown up by a charge of 250 lb. of ammonal. The Traversed Trench, officially named "Barber's Gallery," was held by the Australians until the Evacuation.⁴⁷

On Oct. 20 work upon the scheme of deep-mining at Lone Pine for offensive purposes had been begun. The miners, after sinking their shaft 60 feet, worked forward until on Nov. 28 they were beneath their own high-level system. It was then remarked that the sound of picks in the deep galleries was so clearly heard that there would be no chance of the deep work escaping the enemy's notice. It was therefore abandoned.

At Russell's Top the fighting was, if anything, still closer. Here the front line was protected by a fairly deep "envelope" gallery, which ran slightly in advance of and parallel to it, having been dug by the New Zealand engineers and the light horse before the fighting of August. From the envelope projected a few short low-level tunnels, and from the trenches above there led forward several high-level galleries, which had been hastily extended before the attack of August 7th upon The Nek in order that, if it succeeded, they might be converted into communication trenches.⁴⁸ They were consequently in parts only six inches below the surface. The enemy's galleries were in some places close to them. This was the situation when the 2nd Division became responsible for the sector, and, on September 16th, one of the new field companies—the 5th, under Major Sturdee⁴⁹—took over the mines, one of its four sections working there and the three others at Pope's, Quinn's,⁵⁰ and Courtney's respectively. A new scheme of mining had already been discussed by General Legge and his chief engineer, Colonel Elliott. The subsequent course of the mining operations at Russell's Top was as follows:—

Sept. 16—Captain Cutler⁵¹ commenced a survey of the mining system and trenches on the Top. It was decided to tunnel a new and better firing line.

⁴⁷ The continuation of Woods's Trench, beyond the Australian barricade in it, was several times entered through tunnels. But it lay too close to the new firing line to be used by the Turks, and was filled only by the bodies of men killed in the Battle of Lone Pine.


⁴⁸ Immediately before that attack the 71st (New Army) Fld. Coy. took over the work. On the northern side of The Nek the Turkish galleries were then very close to one of the shallow tunnels, and consequently, on the night before the assault, a charge had to be fired in the most prominent central low-level gallery (L7). During the following month the only engineers on Russell's Top were a section of the 71st Fld. Coy.

⁴⁹ Lieut.-Gen V. A. H. Sturdee, C.B.E., D.S.O., p.s.c. C.R.E., 5th Aust. Div., 1917/18; G.S.O. (2), G.H.Q. British Armies in France, 1918; Chief of the General Staff, Australia, 1940. Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces, of Melbourne, b. Frankston, Vic., 16 Apr., 1890.

⁵⁰ The Quinn's mines had been in charge of Lieut. the Hon. R. T. R. P. Butler, R.E. (afterwards Capt., D.S.O., M.C.).

⁵¹ Maj. R. V. Cutler, M.B.E., M.C. Commanded 4th Fld. Coy. Engrs., 1916/17; 2nd Fld. Coy., 1918/19. Engineer; of Melbourne; b. Clifton Hill, Vic., 1 Nov., 1892.

Early October.—The mining galleries were systematically renumbered, the old surface-tunnels being designated (from left to right) H4, H3, H2, and H1, and the mines leading out of the low-level gallery L11 to L2. General Legge had proposed that the enemy's front trenches at The Nek should be seized by digging through to them and then attacking with bombs. For this purpose on Oct. 16 it was decided to push forward three high-level mines (H4, H3, and H1), which would form the communication trenches, and to keep three low-level mines (L11, L8, and L5) below and ten feet in advance of them in order to protect them.⁵² At this time the mines on Russell's Top, with the exception of Arnall's, were being worked by 15 men of the engineers, with 26 miners from the infantry, and 56 men for such work as carrying away the earth.



End of October.—Turkish mining was heard at the end of all three high-level tunnels. It appeared to be below their level, but above that of the lower tunnels. A Turkish gallery which thus lay between H4 and L11 was blown in, but in the process part of the shallow roof of H4 was shaken down, and the enemy by throwing large bombs at night into the cavity increased the breach. They similarly broke in with bombs the roof of H1, which had been timbered.

Nov. 7-9.—H1, H3, and L6 all broke at different points into the same Turkish gallery, apparently a section of the Turkish "envelope."⁵³ In H1, when the picks went through, work was at once stopped and a sentry posted. During that night the sentry heard the Turks shovelling earth, and threw a bomb which stopped their work. By next day each side had constructed in its tunnel a barricade, over the top of which the respective sentries were firing shots through the hole. It was decided to blow the Turks away by thrusting a charge of gun-cotton through the opening and exploding it in their gallery. To do this, Lieut. Small,⁵⁴ carrying the explosive on his back, crept forward to a position near the hole; waited until the enemy had fired a shot through it; and then, trusting that another shot would not immediately follow, lit the fuse and lowered the charge through the hole into the enemy's gallery, and withdrew. The gun-cotton duly exploded, but increased the size of the hole—a result which was not desired. Small therefore repeated the process and exploded another charge.

It was on this day (Nov. 9) that the miners in H3 broke into the same Turkish gallery. Small at once visited the place, and obtained from the infantry garrison two sentries whom he posted behind a barricade near the hole. The sentries presently reported that the flicker of a light had appeared at the opening, and that the enemy

⁵² The high-level mines were 6 ft high by 3 ft. wide, the low-level 4 ft. by 3 ft.

⁵³ In L6 the breach was an old one which was reopened on Nov. 7 by Lieut. Small, who then explored part of the Turkish work.

⁵⁴ Lieut. F. T. Small; 5th Fld Coy Engrs. Engineer, of Blackall, Q'land, b Brisbane, 4 May, 1889.

had evidently been examining it. Small hurried thither; as he sat in a corner watching the opening, a revolver was fired through it, the shots striking the tunnel wall. In the Australian gallery was a heap of loose earth forming a low natural barricade. Small graded this down so that a bomb placed upon it should roll down the slope into the hole, and then, leaving the sentries to keep guard, went off to his other work. For some reason the sentries, who were drawn from the 26th Bn., which was then new to the post, withdrew for twenty yards along the tunnel. A complicated situation followed, in which the local staff gained the impression that the enemy had captured the head of the tunnel. Small, however, working with an officer of the infantry, built a barricade, and then pushed it forward until the whole tunnel had been regained.

It was now determined to fire a tamped charge in the tunnel. Before this could be done, it was necessary to clear away the heap of loose earth near its end. Accordingly on Nov. 10 L/Cpl. Moy⁵⁵ crept forward and, working for six hours in the dark within a few feet of the hole, scraped the earth clear. By this time Small, who was worn out, had been relieved by Capt. Cutler, and he, going forward with Moy, placed the explosive at the end of the gallery. The Turks could be heard scratching at the other side of the wall of earth, which was only a foot in thickness. The mine was fired, and for the time being sealed the hole; but the thin roof of the Australian gallery was shaken in, leaving it open to the air. On the following day Moy went out to this section, now open to the sky, to clear away the debris of the explosion and discover the result. The work was especially dangerous since he was close to the trenches of the Turks, who, possibly observing that work was being done, from time to time threw bombs into the opening. Moy had been at work for four hours when he was caught by one of these grenades and mortally wounded.

Meanwhile on Nov. 10 it had become necessary to explode a third small charge in the southern high-level tunnel H1. Capt. Cutler effected this by crawling over two Australian barricades, the enemy meanwhile firing over their own barrier. Three days later the task had to be repeated. On this occasion Cutler and Small, who had returned to duty, crawled over the Australian barricade to a heap of earth seven feet from the Turks' barrier, over which the enemy was firing. Lying behind the loose earth, they managed—by throwing stones to their right and flashing a torch in that direction—to attract his fire to that side of the tunnel. They then cautiously pushed the charge over the debris on the left. It took them another fifteen minutes to get the explosive into such a position that they could light the fuse and retire. The explosion which followed caused the roof to fall in. Ten yards of the gallery thus became untenable, and had to be given up to the enemy.

Nov. 20.—The Turks were mining so close to the lower gallery L5 (which protected H1) that it was decided to put an end to the trouble by firing a very big charge in L5. Accordingly 500 lb. of ammonal were placed in it and were exploded next day. A party of the 26th Bn. lay out in dead ground on the edge of this crater, and on Nov. 23 killed or wounded with bombs several of the enemy who came out to occupy it.

⁵⁵ L/Cpl. J. Moy (No 4426, 5th Fld. Coy. Engrs.). Sawyer; of Daylesford, Vic.; b. Adelaide, 1884. Died of wounds, 13 Nov., 1915.

Meanwhile on Nov. 18 the Turks had fired a mine near another shallow tunnel (H4), killing 2 Australians and wounding 3. The Australians cleared away the débris, and then pushed forward a barricade into the Turkish tunnel in which this mine had been fired. There the enemy built a barricade facing them, and for several days firing continued between the two, Lieut. Bailey of the 20th shooting two Turks with his revolver, and three others being hit with bombs. The enemy took advantage of the "Silent Battle"⁵⁸ to sap out to this crater and occupy it. The Australians, in reply, began to undermine him, and the work was in progress when orders for the Evacuation arrived.⁵⁷

The underground fighting at Lone Pine and Russell's Top was no closer than at Quinn's or Hill 60, and at Courtney's, German Officers', and The Apex it was at times equally keen. As a result, by the middle of November the Anzac mines were either approaching or else actually beneath the enemy's trenches at most of the vital posts of his line. The position was then such that, if all the mines had been exploded simultaneously, there could undoubtedly have been administered to him a shock only comparable to that inflicted upon the Germans two years later by the firing of the mines at Messines. A general attack launched at the moment of the explosions might have met with important success; but, although as a feint or a subsidiary attack such a stroke might have been invaluable and almost decisive, it could not crush or pierce the Turkish Army unless supported by strong reserves; and these never came to Gallipoli. It is true that the troops, always optimistic, lived upon rumours such as the report that 500,000 Russians were about to deliver a counter-blow parrying the German stroke through Serbia. Some based hopes upon schemes that appeared more fantastic still—such as a rumoured plan of seizing Achi Baba by means of armoured "land-battleships," which, it was said, were being built in England.⁵⁸ A scheme for flooding and washing away the enemy's trenches by means of a stream of water directed at high pressure from a nozzle was suggested by Captain Abbott⁵⁹ and other Australians experienced in mining. This was referred by Hamilton to his chief engineer. A proposal more

⁵⁸ See pp. 842-5.

⁵⁷ The mines prepared for use at the Evacuation were Arnall's two tunnels and L11 and L8 (the low-level galleries originally dug to protect H4 and H3 respectively).

⁵⁸ This rumour almost certainly had reference to the "tanks," although they were not brought into use until twelve months later.

⁵⁹ Capt R. H S Abbott; Permanent Supernumerary List. Engineer, of Bendigo, Vic: b. Bendigo, 12 Jan., 1884

frequently discussed in the trenches was that, during one of the storms which in the autumn swept occasionally over the Peninsula, and which always temporarily rendered the enemy inactive and less vigilant, the whole line should deliver a preconcerted assault by simply walking over the Turkish trenches. Birdwood himself was half-attracted by the notion, but the condition of some of his troops after bad weather made its adoption impracticable.

In the absence of adequate reserves, plans of offensive action were necessarily restricted to schemes that might appear fanciful, but little real apprehension was entertained of a Turkish attack. It is true that the unit commanders of the 54th Division were not in all cases confident that they could hold out if seriously attacked, but it may be doubted if there was any real ground for anxiety. The light horsemen occupying the inner line of defences had no doubt whatever as to the result of any Turkish incursion. "I hope they'll try it," said Colonel Glasgow to a friend. "What would it matter if 1,000 or 2,000 Turks got through? What would it have mattered at Pope's? We should simply have captured or killed the lot." The artillery at Anzac was increased in September to 92, and in October to 109 guns, and now included four modern 6-inch howitzers of the 17th (British) Siege Battery. As for the enemy, he showed no tendency to attack; all indications pointed in the other direction. Every night his working parties were out in front of the trenches erecting wire entanglements against possible assault by the Anzac troops. On Russell's Top and elsewhere the enemy appeared to be filling in his front trench with barbed-wire and withdrawing to his support line.⁶⁰ Along the main range his breastworks were being extended in line after line. A ledge—sometimes assumed to be a sunken road, but in reality a wide trench filled with barbed-wire—became apparent encircling the summit of Chunuk Bair. Strong redoubts were established on the other main crests.⁶¹ In October the intelligence staff at G.H.Q. prudently warned all troops that a fanatical attack

⁶⁰ Part of the secret sunken trench in front of the Jolly was observed by a patrol about this time. At the Jolly it was this trench, and not his regular front line, that the enemy was filling with barbed-wire. The Australians were not fully aware of this, and, had they attacked, would have been met by a most formidable obstacle.

⁶¹ These and the ledge encircling Chunuk Bair are clearly illustrated in the plate at p. 719.

might be made upon them during the Mohammedan feast of Bairam, which lasted from the 18th to the 20th of the month. But the celebration was marked in a different fashion. The 'Turks opposite Quinn's and near German Officers', who among themselves were receiving visits and exchanging presents, ceased hostilities and, making signs from their parapet, threw cigarettes to the men of the 17th and 21st Battalions—who flung cigarettes and "bully beef" in return.⁶²

The impression generally received during the autumn was that the enemy's morale had somewhat declined. This seems to have been partly due to the fact that, as soon as he had defeated Hamilton's August offensive, Liman von Sanders received from Constantinople orders to send back to Thrace the fine units of the Second Army which had been previously lent him. Their place was largely filled by troops of Arab extraction from the First Army, in whose courage and training Liman von Sanders had little confidence.⁶³ By wedging in among them the first-rate battalions of the Constantinople Fire Brigade, he strengthened them for defence, but "they could not be used for attack." Although, therefore, von Sanders would have liked to undertake at least local offensives, he had not the power to do so. Nor was the gas attack, of which the British staff was rightly apprehensive, ever launched by the enemy. A few German shells or bombs containing "tear gas," which caused the eyes to water, and was intended to

⁶² At Quinn's these overtures occurred on three days. (On previous occasions notes had been thrown into that post. One received about the time of the Battles of Loos and Champagne ran: "Congratulate you on having killed 20,000 Boches.") On the first morning at about 8.30, after making signs from their trenches, the Turks threw out a cigarette-case. An Australian climbed out and brought it in. On the packet (*see plate at p. 399*) was scrawled: "Prenez avec plaisir; à notre héros ennemis" (Turkish soldiers' French for "Take, with pleasure; to our heroic enemy"). Another was inscribed: "Notre cher ennemi" ("our dear enemy"). It is said that a third was inscribed "Envoyez milk" ("send condensed milk"), and that when "bully beef" was thrown to them a message was flung back, wrapped round a stone, "Bully beef non." At 9.15—possibly on the approach of one of their officers—the Turks called out "*fini*," and waved the Australians down. A note was, however, thrown over which (on being translated) read: "Dear Australians, the penknife which you threw over has fallen behind our parapots. Will you let me get out of the trench at this time to-morrow to fetch it?" Another note was to the following effect: "Do you know how far it is to Constantinople? We hope to see you there one of these days." Next day a similar fraternisation occurred, a Turk being allowed to climb out and get the pocket-knife. This day an interpreter was present to speak to the enemy, and an officer of the 17th was on the parapet. An unpleasant situation nearly arose when the latter picked up a linen packet which proved to contain a bomb. It was, however, presently seen that the fuse was burnt out, and that the bomb must have been one thrown previously by the enemy, who often wrapped them in this manner. The higher authorities were always suspicious of such overtures, and by the third day orders had arrived that they were not to be permitted.

⁶³ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 123.

hamper observation, were thrown into The Apex and Brown's Dip, and on the southern flank; the chemical which they contained was the only "gas" used by either side at Anzac.⁶⁴


Between the end of August and the last week in November the only occasions on which the enemy at Anzac showed any aggressiveness were when he made some local advance in answer to a previous movement by his opponents. When, for example, on the evening of November 9th the 16th Battalion endeavoured unsuccessfully to steal from him a knoll known as "Hackney Wick," on the lower spurs of Hill Q,⁶⁵ he forthwith occupied and fortified the knoll far more strongly than before. Similarly on November 15th, when the 54th Division exploded a large mine beneath his front trench at Hill 60, although the Turkish garrison was destroyed, the enemy at once occupied the mine-crater, obtaining a somewhat better command than that afforded by his previous position.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ It was suspected that a different gas was on one occasion employed by the enemy in the mines at Helles, where lachrimatory (i.e., "tear") gas was also employed by him. Information had been received that the Germans were determined to introduce gas into the Gallipoli fighting, and the increasing use of tear bombs was thought, probably rightly, to prelude its employment. In case the Turks made a gas attack the British had at the Dardanelles a sufficient supply of poison gas to enable them to retaliate by discharging it on a 1,000-yards front for half-an-hour. They were not, however, tricked into using it in reply to the enemy's tear bombs. In some reports references are made to a number of Australians who were "gassed" on the Peninsula. These, however, were men who were injured by the poisonous gases following the explosion of some of their own mines. If a mine, when fired, did not break through satisfactorily to the open air or to the enemy's workings, the poisonous gas left by the explosion remained in the tunnel, endangering the life of anyone who entered it. For example, on Oct. 29, in order to make sure that a working party might safely enter Tunnel C2, in which a mine had just been fired, Lieut. F. D. A. Bowra (of Perth) of the 4th Fld. Coy. went down the rope ladder in the shaft leading to it. He had warned Lieut. E. T. Bazeley (of Nagambie, Vic.) of the 22nd Bn. that there might be danger from poisonous gases, and as he did not return Bazeley and a man named Currington (of Annandale, N.S.W.) went down with a rope. They found Bowra collapsed, but before they could rescue him both were overcome. Bazeley had barely strength to climb the ladder; Currington began to climb and fell back. Maj. Newcombe and Lieut. Thom were summoned from the 4th Coy.'s H.Q., and Thom, refusing to be tied to the rope, went down, but collapsed before he could save Bowra. The gas was now coming up the shaft. Cpls. J. A. Park (of Sydney), C. F. Mills (of Sydney), W. Bowden (of Geelong, Vic.), J. Shaw (of Kalgoorlie, W. Aust.), and others went down, but Thom, Bowra, Currington, and two other men of the 22nd, Pte. W. B. S. Good (of Wonthaggi, Vic.) and Pte. G. Stelling (of Essendon, Vic.) died, and Col. G. C. E. Elliott, chief engineer of the division, Maj. S. F. Newcombe, and twelve others were seriously "gassed." (Currington had five brothers serving at the war.) A similar accident had occurred shortly before in a mine-gallery at Russell's Top, where an officer of the 5th Fld. Coy., Lieut. E. J. Howells (of Camberwell, Vic.), became unconscious, but was dragged out by Cpl. J. H. Precious (of Melbourne), who himself collapsed just as he reached safety. Both survived.

⁶⁵ The assaulting party was checked while crawling along the razor-edge leading to its objective.

⁶⁶ The 54th Div. had been preparing for some months an attack upon Hill 60, to be delivered immediately after the explosion; but the mines, which were dug by the Welch Horse, were endangered by the approach of the enemy's tunnels and had to be prematurely exploded.

It was the activity of the light horse at the opposite end of Anzac which occasioned the sharpest fight that occurred during this phase of the campaign. Early in the morning of August 23rd Ryrie's 2nd Light Horse Brigade had carried out with brilliant success the raid which had originally been planned for the night of August 6th.⁶⁷ It was possibly this or a subsequent encounter on October 9th⁶⁸ which stimulated the enemy into a further encroachment along the seaside ridge, on which his nearest post was till then the Bird Trenches, 300 yards south of Chatham's. Between the two, but somewhat nearer to the Turks, there existed in the seaside ridge a small but pronounced dip into which neither the light horse at Chatham's nor the enemy at Bird Trenches could see.⁶⁹ During the night of October 24th the Turkish working parties were observed advancing from the Bird Trenches, and by their persistence when fired on it was evident that the enemy had determined to extend his defences so as to reach the northern side of this depression. The light horse




⁶⁷ See pp. 487-8, 496 The raid had been then countermanded; but after the Battle of Scimitar Hill a demonstration was required in order to test a report that the enemy was withdrawing troops from the southern flank of Anzac. Accordingly the 5th L.H. Regt. undertook what would later have been called a "trench-raid" against the Bird Trenches—on the seaward ridge south of Chatham's. Occasionally between midnight and 3 a.m. the destroyer *Colne*, which was maintaining the usual watch on that flank, bombarded the Bird Trenches, keeping them under her search-light. At 3.30, just after the set of the moon, Maj. Midgley with one squadron went south from Chatham's along the ridge towards the Turkish post. To cover Midgley, Maj. H. H. Johnston (of Casino, N.S.W.) with another squadron worked along the coast-line and lay down opposite the Bird Trenches, facing inland. Midgley's squadron was within a hundred yards of the same trenches when a Turkish sentry fired at it. The squadron kept low and crept forward to within fifteen yards, when the sentry fired again. At this stage—about 4.15—the destroyer, by arrangement, bombarded the trench for five minutes. Midgley's squadron then hurled a volley of some forty bombs and rushed the position. The enemy garrison, about 100 strong, had left the trench in order to shelter from the destroyer's fire. The trench was seized, and about thirty of the enemy were shot. Before daylight the enemy's reserves began to approach, and the light horse, after firing upon them, withdrew without any serious casualty.

⁶⁸ On this day an Arab deserter of the 77th Regt. endeavoured to make his way from Gaba Tepe along the beach to the Anzac lines, but was wounded before reaching them. At nightfall a party of the 5th Light Horse under Lieut. Brundrit went out to bring in the man, successfully drove off a Turkish detachment which was approaching for the same purpose, and rescued the deserter.

⁶⁹ See plate at p. 272.


were already tunnelling towards the same point, but their gallery had not yet covered two-thirds of the distance. The work therefore now became a race to anticipate the enemy. It was intended that, when the tunnel reached a point 100 yards south of Chatham's, a number of small rifle-pits should be opened up from it on the inland face of the ridge, just north of the depression. But the work was only nearing completion when on November 3rd the breaking-out of fresh enemy earthworks on the southern side indicated that the enemy's final rush to secure the depression must be imminent. It was accordingly determined that the northern side must be occupied by the Australians during the ensuing night. Fortunately on the rear or seaward slope of the hill there existed some old unoccupied Turkish works, comprising three unconnected sections of trench. It had been intended to make use of them as a second avenue of communication to the new position; but, even if the rifle-pits were not ready, it would be possible by cleaning out and connecting the first two sections of the old Turkish works to establish a new post 120 yards south of Chatham's and within bomb-throw of the depression. Accordingly after dusk on November 3rd the work was begun by parties under Major Midgley, a covering detachment under Captain Brundrit⁷⁰ lying in front. The Turkish working parties could be heard not a hundred yards away, but there was no interference. By daylight the post on the seaward slope had been established, and was held by thirty-four men. The tunnelled rifle-pits on the inland slope were, however, not yet ready.

It seems to have been 11 o'clock in the morning of November 4th before the enemy realised what the light horse had done. His reply was then immediate. He opened at once



⁷⁰ Capt. T. J. Brundrit; 5th L.H. Regt. Accountant; of Brisbane, b. Brisbane, 15 Oct., 1882. Killed in action, 8 Nov., 1915.

with artillery and broomstick bombs, and, after dark, crossed the dip, and between 8.30 and 11.30 under cover of machine-gun fire four times attacked the light horse position with bombs. A few Turks reached the parapet, but were killed.⁷¹ The enemy, however, had carried forward sandbags, and had established on the same knoll as the light horse two breast-works, twenty and seventy yards respectively from the new position of the light horse. General Ryrie⁷² at once informed the 5th Regiment, which was holding the post, that the breast-works must be captured with the bayonet if necessary. Such an operation would, however, be difficult and possibly expensive. The 5th, which during the night threw 500 bombs, was keeping the enemy at the nearer breastwork inactive, while Ryan's⁷³ "catapult-battery"—six large cross-bows flinging small bombs by means of india-rubber slings—kept down the fire of the Turks on Holly Ridge. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson⁷⁴ assured the brigadier that he had the Turkish position under control by means of bombs. Ryrie, trusting his two leaders on the spot, Wilson and Midgley, in a highly difficult situation, exercised his judgment for a second time⁷⁵ in favour of avoiding what seemed unnecessary loss. The decision was justified by the result. A company of the 11th Battalion was brought up next day as a reserve, but the enemy made no further attack. On November 5th the light horse opened up the tunnelled fire-pits, and two nights later,



View southwards along the summit of Harris Ridge from the new Australian position, 5th November, 1915. 1. Turkish breastwork, seventy yards distant. 2. Turkish breastwork, twenty yards distant. 3. Bird Trenches. The sandbags in the foreground are British. (*From the diary of the Official War Correspondent.*)

⁷¹ A disaster was nearly caused by a lighted grenade falling into a tray of bombs in the Australian trench. Sgt. J. E. Orr (of Mount Morgan, Q'land) seized the tray and threw it clear of the trench.

⁷² Ryrie had been severely wounded by a shell on Sept. 29, but had just returned from hospital.

⁷³ The battery was commanded by Sgt. P. F. Ryan (of Melbourne).

⁷⁴ Brig.-Gen. L. C. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded 3rd L.H. Bde, 1917/19. Solicitor; b. Brisbane, 11 July, 1871.

⁷⁵ See pp. 487-8.

protected by artillery fire,⁷⁶ seized the third section of the old Turkish trench on the seaward slope, and from that position bombed the enemy finally out of the more advanced barricade.⁷⁷ The farther breastwork was partly demolished on November 14th by a gun of the 6th Battery, which was fired by Lieutenant Dodd⁷⁸ and Sergeant Croft⁷⁹ from an open position at Brown's Dip, Major Stevenson⁸⁰ in the advanced light horse trenches directing the deflection, with his own shells just clearing his head. The bare foothold which the enemy retained appears to have been of no use to him. By their digging the light horse had long since made the right flank absolutely secure. Their snipers regularly shot down every periscope and smashed in every loop-hole within 400 yards of their line. Their commander was as stout as his men, and at no time did Birdwood or his staff have the least apprehension concerning that corner of the position.⁸¹

Such was the fighting at Anzac during the period from August 29th to November 24th. During the same time, chiefly through sickness, great changes occurred in the staff. That of the original 1st Australian Division had by the beginning of November been largely transferred to the A. & N.Z. Army Corps and to the 2nd Division. Birdwood's chief-of-staff, Skeen, was sent away on September 9th ill with enteric fever, and replaced by C. B. B. White. As has been already related,⁸² Major Griffiths was brought to Corps Headquarters to deal with matters concerning the personnel of the A.I.F., while Colonel Howse, after continually urging the obvious need for one responsible authority to control the medical organisation

⁷⁶ An urgent call by the light horse for artillery fire was answered in two minutes by fire from the 9th Bty., A.F.A., and very soon after by the 5th (Lowland) Howitzer and 17th Siege Batteries.

⁷⁷ Capt. Brundrit was killed while emptying his revolver at fifteen yards' range into the enemy's riflemen.

⁷⁸ Maj. A. W. Dodd, D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 6th Bty, A.F.A., 1916/18. Clerk; of Melbourne, b. Melbourne, 12 Aug., 1894.

⁷⁹ Capt. C. W. Croft, M.C., M.M., 102nd Bty, A.F.A. Coachsmith, of Melbourne, b. Prahran, Vic., 28 Jan., 1888.

⁸⁰ Lieut.-Col. G. I. Stevenson, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 3rd (Army) Bde, A.F.A., 1917/18. Public accountant; of Melbourne, b. Glasgow, Scotland, 8 March, 1882.

⁸¹ The new position, thenceforth the southernmost in the Anzac Line, was called "Wilson's Lookout." In the fighting connected with its capture, between Nov. 4 and 9, the Australian losses were 14 killed and 67 wounded. Besides the 5th L.H. Regt., the 4th, 6th, and 7th of the same brigade, and a company of the 11th Bn. were involved, either as reliefs, working parties, or reserves.

⁸² See p. 418.

at Anzac, was himself appointed D.D.M.S.—a position which he soon vacated on receiving the appointment of D.M.S., A.I.F.⁸³ Thenceforward it was with White, Howse, Griffiths, and (in later years) Colonel Dodds as his advisers that Birdwood administered the Australian Imperial Force.

On October 16th, after Hamilton had been recalled, Birdwood for the time being left the corps in order to act as Commander-in-Chief at Imbros. In his absence the Anzac command devolved nominally upon the senior divisional commander,⁸⁴ but was in reality mainly borne by White until November 25th, when Birdwood was given the Dardanelles Army, and, moving to his headquarters at Imbros, passed to Godley the command of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. White, Carruthers, Lesslie, and most of the heads of the corps staff remained with Godley at Anzac. Birdwood's new army staff was built up mainly with officers who, like its chief, Colonel Aspinall, had been allotted from G.H.Q., but also partly with members—mainly subordinates—of his old staff. Birdwood himself, in spite of his promotion, could hardly tear himself away from his daily tour of the front line and his intimate personal touch with the men. As an army commander he constantly inspected one or other of his fronts, visiting Anzac, for example, on December 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th.

Upon Godley's transfer to the corps, the N.Z. & A. Division was given to Brigadier-General Russell, who was temporarily succeeded in the command of the Mounted Rifles Brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel Meldrum.⁸⁵ The 54th Division was, during General Inglefield's absence, commanded by Brigadier-General Hodgson⁸⁶ of the Eastern Mounted Brigade, a leader afterwards associated with the light horse in Palestine. In the 1st Australian Division General Walker was, on September 29th, half-buried by a shell which burst in his dugout, and a fortnight later was severely wounded by a machine-gun

⁸³ That is, Director of the Medical Services of the A.I.F. His previous position (D.D.M.S.) was Deputy-Director of the Medical Services of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

⁸⁴ Usually Godley, but, when he was absent from Anzac, Legge.

⁸⁵ The command of the N.Z.M.R. Bde. was eventually given to Brig.-Gen. E. W. C. Chaytor.

⁸⁶ Maj. Gen. Sir Henry W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O. Commanded Imperial (afterwards Aust.) Mtd. Div., 1916/18. Officer of British Regular Army; of Sussex, Eng., b. London, 29 June, 1868. Died 5 Feb., 1930

when visiting a loop-holed gallery in the cliff at the southern end of Silt Spur. His place was taken by Brigadier-General Hobbs of the divisional artillery. Within a few weeks both Hobbs of the 1st and Legge of the 2nd Division had been sent away sick, and the end of November found the two Australian divisions commanded by Brigadier-Generals Chauvel and Holmes respectively.